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Disqualification of Judges for Campaign
Support or Opposition
GERALD UELMEN*

Should a judge be disqualified from sitting on a case in which a substantial
supporter or opponent of his or her election campaign is a litigant or a lawyer? Currently, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct (JudicialCode) would
not require such disqualification. Although the Canons would require a justice who owned a single share of stock in Pennzoil or Texaco to disqualify
himself from hearing a dispute between the corporations, I the contribution of
$387,700 by these two companies to the campaign coffers of five Texas
Supreme Court Justices did not require the disqualification of any of these
2
judges.
The resistance to a rule requiring such disqualification reflects disconcerting reality; judges are dependent upon lawyers and potential litigants as the
principal source of financing for election campaigns. 3 Few lawyers would
contribute to a judge's campaign if their contributions would require the
judge to no longer hear their cases (others might gleefully offer a contribution for that very reason). If we continue to subject judges to the world of
political campaigning, can we in fairness eliminate financial support from
those in the best position to evaluate their performance? Would we not simply increase their reliance on special interest groups to provide the campaign
funds they need?
These are sensitive questions, and we must provide sensitive answers. This
article proposes a change in the Judicial Code to require disqualification in
carefully defined circumstances. Those circumstances include the situations
with greatest potential to embarrass the appearance of justice. It is not the
intent of this proposal, however, to eliminate all lawyer support or opposition
from judicial campaigns. I proceed on the premise that it would not only be
an impractical and elusive goal, but it would have an undesirable impact
* Dean and Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A. 1962, Loyola Marymount University; J.D. 1965, LL.M. 1966, Georgetown University Law Center. The author would
like to acknowledge the assistance of Peter Viano, Santa Clara University School of Law, J.D. 1990,
for his research for this article.
1. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to disqualify himself when he "has a
financial interest... in a party to the proceeding ....

" MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon 3C(1)(c) (1972) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CODE]. "Financial interest" is defined to include
"ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small .. " JUDICIAL CODE, Canon 3C(3)(c).
2. Kaplan, Justicefor Sale, COMMON CAUSE, May/June, 1987 at 29; Applebome, Texas Court
Fight Puts Focus on Elected Judges, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1988, at B4, col.3.
3. DuBois, Financing Trial Court Elections: Who Contributes to CaliforniaJudicial Campaigns?,
70 JUDICATURE 8 (June/July, 1986).
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upon judicial selection. The form that lawyer contributions take is an important consideration, however, if preserving the appearance of justice is our
goal. A rule of dfsqualification can significantly impact the form that lawyer
contributions take, and alleviate our concern for appearances. The problem
of substance, in which large contributions by special interest groups continue
to influence the selection of judges, is a problem that cannot be alleviated by
a rule of disqualification. Thus, the proposal is not offered as the "clear,
simple solution" to the problem of judicial campaign fundraising. 4 It is offered in the hope that it can modestly improve an increasingly grim and
grimy reality.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

At the trial level, elections have been the prevailing mode of selection in
most states for many years. Only eleven states do not elect judges for courts
of general jurisdiction. 5 What is changing, however, is the rising cost of campaigns for these positions. A recent survey disclosed that the mean total
campaign expenditure by candidates for contested Municipal Court seats in
California increased from $35,218 in 1978 to $49,815 in 1982.6 In Cook
County, Illinois, 76 candidates for Circuit Court positions at stake in the
general election in 1984 raised a total of $846,903. The average winner
amassed a campaign treasury of $23,506. 7 In Maryland, candidates for the
Circuit Court raised an average of $22,525 in 1982, which doubled the average for 1980 races.8
The most dramatic changes, however, are occurring in appellate court
races. Twenty-three states still utilize contested elections to select supreme
court justices, and these races have taken on all the trappings of other statewide contests, including the need for large campaign treasuries. From 1983
to 1986, the average amount of campaign contributions collected by successful Texas Supreme Court candidates increased 219%, from $272,189 to
$868,604. In the Ohio race for Chief Justice $2.7 million was spent, compared to $99,192 spent in 1980. In Kentucky $183,000 was spent in one race
for the Supreme Court, a 252% increase over the last race for the same seat
in 1978. Montana's two candidates for Chief Justice spent $247,342 in 1986,
4. "Simple solutions to the problems of judicial campaign financing would be perfect examples of
the Mencken maxim: 'For every complex human problem, there is an answer that is clear, simple,
and wrong.'" Schotland, Elective Judges Campaign Financing: Are State Judges' Robes the Em-

perour'.
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6. Schotland, supra note 4, at 134.
7. Nicholson & Weiss, Funding Judicial Campaigns in the Circuit Court of Cook County, 70
JUDICATURE

17, 19 (June/July, 1986).

8. Schotland, supra note 4, at 137.
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a 320% increase over the 1980 race.9
Even states which utilize retention elections are not immune from this
trend. An all-time national record of $10.7 million was spent on both sides
of the 1986 California campaign resulting in the removal of Chief Justice
Rose Bird and Associate Justices Joseph Grodin and Cruz Reynoso.' 0
Where is the money coming from to finance such massive campaigns?
Contributions by lawyers and law firms represent the largest share of contributions to judicial campaign coffers. A study of the 1984 Cook County elections revealed that over 50% of the itemized contributions in both the
primary and general elections came from attorneys and law firms. I Contributions were heaviest for sitting judges, whether or not they faced a significant threat of removal or not.
Thus the motive for giving would seem connected to the current role of the
the
candidate as a sitting judge; this clearly raises the question whether
12
donor is seeking to influence the judge through the contribution.
Of a total of 481 itemized contributions from attorneys and law firms, 88%
were for less than $499. Ten percent of such contributions were in13the $500999 range, while 10 contributions (2%) were for $1000 or more.
A similar pattern emerges in a study of the 1980 judicial elections in California. Lawyers and law firms were found to have supplied 39.2% of the
contributions over $1000 in the primary election, and 32.4% of such contributions in the runoff elections.14 The proportion was significantly larger for
incumbent judges, with 49.3% of contributions over $100 to incumbent Superior Court judges coming from the legal profession.' 5 Of a total of 1,312
95%
individual contributions from lawyers and law firms, approximately
16
more.
or
$500
for
were
5%
while
were for $499 or less,
The big-money races for State Supreme Court seats also rely heavily on
lawyer contributions, and such contributions can reach sizeable proportions.
Justice Joseph Grodin revealed that the principal source of campaign contributions for the 1986 California Supreme Court race was "lawyers and groups
that had some interest, not to say stake, in the judicial process."'1 7 Plaintiffs'
9. Kaplan, supra note 2, at 30.
10. Thompson, JudicialRetention Elections and JudicialMethod: A Retrospective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S.CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2038 (1988).
11. Nicholson & Weiss, supra note 7, at 21. Other major contributors included non-attorney
individuals, 27%; corporations, 11%; and labor unions, 4%. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 19.
14. DuBois, supra note 3, at 12.
15. Id. at 14.
16. Id. at 12-13.
17. Grodin, JudicialElections: The CaliforniaExperience, 70 JUDICATURE 365, 368 (April/May,

1987).
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law firms and individual lawyers representing plaintiffs contributed at least
$425,000 with over $160,000 coming from one law firm and its partners. 8 In
the 1986 Texas Supreme Court races, lawyers for Pennzoil contributed
$315,000 to five justices, while lawyers for Texaco contributed $72,700 to the
same five justices.' 9 In Ohio, after the newly elected Chief Justice disqualified himself from five hearings in which campaign contributors were lawyers,
the State Bar President lamented: "The campaign was so expensive and so
much money was raised that damn nearly every prominent lawyer in the
20
State of Ohio gave to somebody."
II.

THE CURRENT CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

The Model Code of JudicialConduct, adopted by the American Bar Association in 1972, approaches judicial campaign contributions from a strategy
of insulation and concealment. While it recognizes that lawyers will contribute to a judge's campaign coffers, it assumes that such contributions can be
solicited and collected indirectly, without a judge's participation and knowledge. Thus, a judge is enjoined from personally soliciting or accepting campaign funds, but is permitted to establish "committees of responsible
persons" to solicit campaign contributions. 2 1 The Canon explicitly provides
that "such committees are not prohibited from soliciting campaign contribu'2 2
tions and public support from lawyers."
The prohibition of direct solicitation by judges has produced some interpretations that can only be characterized as bizarre. It has been suggested
that a judge may not personally attend a fundraising function given on his
behalf, for example, because he would discover identities of his contributors. 23 An exception has been recognized to permit a judge to directly solicit
his relatives, since he would have to disqualify himself in any event if the
24
same relatives appeared before him in a case.
If this was ever a realistic approach to regulating campaign fundraising by
judges, its continuing vitality was seriously compromised by widespread enactment of campaign disclosure laws during the 1970s. Each of the 50 states
and the District of Columbia now require the reporting of all campaign contributions, requiring disclosure of the identity of the donor for contributions
exceeding a specified amount. 25 Ordinarily the disclosure statement must be
18. Thompson, supra note 10, at 2038.
19. Kaplan, supra note 2, at 29.
2 0. J ". at 3.J

21. JUDICIAL CODE, Canon 7B(2).
22. Id.
23. Georgia Jud. Qualifications Comm'n, Op. No. 22 (1978).
24. New York State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. No. 289 (1973).
25. Statutes are collected in Banner, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Contributions,40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 471 n.122 (1988).
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personally verified and signed by the candidate. Thus, it is no longer possible
to insulate a judge from knowing the identity of the donors. This problem
was recognized in a commentary to the Canon: "Unless the candidate is required by law to file a list of his campaign contributors, their names should
'26
not be revealed to the candidate."

III.

CURRENT USE OF JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION

In most jurisdictions today, a judge can be disqualified for bias, and a
showing of bias requires only a showing that "a reasonable person" would
doubt the judge's ability to decide the case impartially. 27 Frequently, such
motions allege that support or opposition in an election campaign gives rise
to a reasonable appearance of bias. There appears to be substantial uncertainty, however, over what kind of support or opposition will be deemed
sufficient to require recusal. In Florida, disqualification has been required
where an attorney for one party was co-chairing the judge's current reelection campaign, 28 but not where an attorney complied with a request for an
"endorsement" in the judge's current campaign. 29 In Alabama, a judge who
owed his appointment to the bench to the governor who was party to a divorce proceeding was required to recuse himself,30 while a judge whose principal opponent for appointment was actively supported by one party to a
3
divorce was not. 1
In Texas, disqualification has been limited to cases of direct interest in the
32
outcome or relationship to the parties, as specified in the state constitution.
Thus, motions for disqualification are routinely denied even where a party
33
has made substantial contributions to a judge's campaign fund.
The lack of clear guidelines as to what kind of contributions or political
activity will require disqualification creates substantial uncertainty for lawyers, litigants and judges. It also invites "judge-shopping," in which support
or opposition may be calculated to eliminate a particular judge from future
cases, rather than to curry his or her favor. Finally, the lack of any "automatic" disqualification eliminates any obligation to disclose possible
26. JUDICIAL CODE, Canon 7B(2) commentary.
27. JUDICIAL CODE, Canon 3C(l) provides: "A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned ... "
28. Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). Cf Melnick v. Melnick, 118
A.D.2d 902, 499 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
29. Marexcelso v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 533 So. 2d 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
30. Wallace v. Wallace, 352 So. 2d 1376 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
31. Miller v. Miller, 385 So. 2d 54 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980).
32. Texas Const., Art. 5, Sec. II. See Calvert, Disqualification of Judges, 47 Tex. Bar J. 1330
(Dec. 1984).
33. River Road Neighborhood Assoc. v. South Texas Sports, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984); Texaco v. Pennzoil, 729 S.W.2d 768, 842 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Rocha v. Ahmad, 662
S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
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grounds. 34 In many cases, grounds for disqualification may be waived simply
because a lawyer or litigant was unaware of the political relationship between
35
the judge and the opposing lawyer or party.
The current Judicial Code contains explicit requirements for disqualification where a relative is a party, a lawyer, a witness, or is otherwise interested
in the outcome of a proceeding before a judge. 36 These provisions should be
amended to include a "substantial contributor" to a campaign in which the
judge was a candidate for judicial office within the preceding two years. A
draft of such an amendment is included in the appendix to this article.
IV.

DEFINING "SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTOR"

This amendment would not require disqualification of a judge for all campaign contributions, only "substantial" ones. A "substantial" contribution
would include any contribution of $500 or more, or service as a campaign
director, treasurer or chairperson.
This would give a clear warning to lawyers and litigants that they risk
disqualification of the judge if campaign contributions exceed $500, or if they
assume a leadership role in the judge's campaign. The risk would also extend
to members of the same firm, whose individual contributions to litigants
would be aggregated for purpose of the $500 limit. If the contributions of a
firm or any of its members exceeded the limit, disqualification would be required if any member of the firm appeared in a case before the judge.
The rule would put the onus on the judge to disqualify himself or herself,
without requiring a motion of either party. Thus, the problem of requiring
disclosure of contributions would be avoided. The provision for remittal of
disqualification in Canon 3D would permit the disqualification to be waived
by other parties and lawyers. This would effectively prevent a lawyer from
contributing to a judge's campaign to eliminate the judge from sitting on his
future cases.
The most obvious loopholes in this proposal are that it offers no protection
for litigants or lawyers who have contributed to a judge's opponent or actively opposed a judge's election, and it invites evasion by the simple expedient of funneling contributions through an intermediary, such as a PAC or
other organization.
A lawyer or litigant who has actively opposed a judge's campaign may
have just as valid a claim for judicial disqualification as one whose opponent
34. L.A. County Bar Ass'n Formal Op. No. 387 (Feb. 10, 1981), advises that a lawyer need not
disclose to opponent that campaign contributions have been made to the judge, since such contributions "become a matter of public record."
35. Adair v. Adair, 670 P.2d 1002 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983).
36. JUDICIAL CODE,supra note 27.
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has supported the judge's campaign. Many states recognize this as legitimate
grounds for a disqualification motion. 37 The amendment to Canon 3C would
not preclude disqualification on this ground, since it still requires disqualification where a judge's impartiality might "reasonably be questioned," and
would provide that disqualification is "not limited to" substantial contributors on behalf of the judge. There is reason not to extend the automatic
provisions of 3C to campaign opponents, however. First, there is no danger
that the lawyer or party at risk would not know of the grounds for a disqualification motion, since the motion would be based on his or her own activity.
Second, the risk is substantial that campaign opposition would be artificially
motivated by an assurance that the judge opposed would be disqualified from
future cases. While Machiavellian contributors who want to disqualify the
judge can be controlled by permitting the opposing party to waive the disqualification, such a remedy makes no sense where the disqualification is
sought by the one whose campaign activity created the problem in the first
place. Finally, the level of support for a judge's opponent will be limited by
the risk that contributions in excess of $500 will require disqualification of
the opponent if he or she is elected.
The risk of evasion by funneling contributions through PACs really raises
an entirely different problem of judicial campaign finances. The use of an
intermediary avoids the problem of the judge's being aware that the lawyer
or litigant before him or her was a contributor to his or her campaign. That
is the most immediate threat to the appearance of justice. The lawyer or
litigant who contributes through a PAC may be seeking the election of a
judge who is sympathetic to certain positions, but that is very different from
seeking the election of a judge who is personally indebted to the individual
lawyer or litigant.
The regulation of PAC contributions can be addressed more directly in the
broader context of election contests in general. 38 Such contributions create
no greater risks in judicial contests than they do in other political contests.
Setting the limit at $500 is an obvious compromise, to permit the vast
majority of lawyer contributions without consequence, while requiring disqualification only for the most significant contributions. Such a limit can be
expected to operate much as a contribution limitation. As Professor DuBois
notes:
On the other hand, a contribution limitation is not necessarily unwise simply because, in the aggregate, it affects few contributors. It may nevertheless perform a useful function by preventing the donation of large sums
37. McDermott v. Grossman, 429 So. 2d 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). Cf In re Epperson, case
No. 19 (Ala. Ct. of Judiciary 1987) (a judge was disciplined for posting a list of lawyers who contributed to his opponent's campaign near the door in his office).
38. See F.E.C. v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
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which, by contemporary standards, would raise significant community concern about the ability of judges to remain impartial in cases involving the
interests of campaign contributors. The difficult issue is in determining the
dollar amount of such a limitation so that it does not unduly restrict the
ability of candidates to raise the funds necessary to conduct meaningful
39
campaigns.
A limitation of two years is imposed, to avoid virtually permanent disqualification where judges are elected to lengthy terms. While even a two-year
lapse would not eliminate the problem of an appearance of impropriety
where a contribution is extremely large, a party would not be precluded from
seeking disqualification under such circumstances even after the two-year
limit. The limit applies only to the automatic disqualification requirement.
V.

PRACTICAL IMPACT ON JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS

A requirement of automatic disqualification where a lawyer or litigant was
a "substantial contributor" to a judge's campaign would motivate the vast
majority of lawyers and potential litigants to avoid becoming "substantial"
contributors to any judge's campaign. By limiting their contributions to less
than $500, and not assuming visible roles of campaign leadership, any future
problem can be avoided. Most important, of course, a judge can simply impose a limit on the amount of contributions to be accepted from lawyers.
Keeping that limit below $500 will largely avoid the problem of future disqualification. An onus will fall on law firms to closely monitor the contributions of their individual members, and the substantial risks created will
motivate serious attention to this situation by even the largest law firms.
As a practical matter, less than 10% of the contributions currently coming
from lawyers and law firms would qualify as "substantial." Thus, this reform would not dramatically change the role of lawyers in financing most
judicial election campaigns.
Where the rule is likely to have the most impact is on the major contests
for Supreme Court seats, where hundreds of thousands of dollars are now
routinely raised. Eliminating lawyers and potential litigants from the ranks
of "substantial contributors" will increase reliance on special interest groups
and PACs for major campaign support. It is disingenuous to suggest, however, that the remedy for special interest contributions is to encourage lawyers and litigants to cough up larger contributions. A way must be found to
limit the contributions of PACs and special interests too, but judicial disqualification is not the remedy for that evil. As already noted, this proposal does
not prevent lawyers and litigants who would otherwise become substantial
39. DuBois, supra note 3.
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contributors from funneling their own contributions through PACs and special interest groups.
Where judicial elections are contested, both sides will labor under the same
limitation. Contributions to either an incumbent judge or the challenger will
create the same risk for the winner. The rule may operate most unfairly in
the context of retention elections, however, where there is active opposition
to a judge. Lawyers and potential litigants will face no restraints in contributing to the removal campaign, while the campaign in support of the judge
will have to contend with the problem of potential disqualification. Retention states may want to seriously consider an outright limitation of all individual contributions to campaigns involving judicial retention.
APPENDIX

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO CANON 3 OF
THE Model Code of Judicial Conduct

A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM THE DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE IMPARTIALLY AND DILIGENTLY.
C.

DISQUALIFICATION
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(d)

(3)

he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such person, or a
substantialcontributorto a campaign in which the judge was a
candidatefor judicial office within the preceding two years,
(i)
is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director or
trustee of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness
in the proceeding.

for the purposes of this section:
(d)

"substantialcontributor" includes:
(i) one who served as a campaign chairperson, director, treasurer or in a similar capacity, and any members of a law
firm with which such a person is affiliated;
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one who contributed $500 or more to the campaign, any
member of a law firm making such a contribution either
directly or indirectly through individual contributions of
its members, and any officer, directoror trustee of a corporation or other entity making such a contribution.
D. REMITTAL OF DISQUALIFICATION
A judge disqualified by the terms of Canon 3C(l)(c) or Canon 3C(l)(d)
may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the record the
basis of his disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the judge's participation, all agree in writing that the
judge's relationship is immaterial or that his financial interest is insubstantial, the judge is no longer disqualified, and may participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated
in the record of the proceeding. If disqualification pursuant to Canon
3C(1)(d) is because a substantialcontributoris a party, or an officer, director
or trustee of a party, or acting as a lawyer in the proceeding, only the agreement of other parties and lawyers is necessary to waive the disqualification.
(ii)

HeinOnline -- 3 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 427 1989-1990

